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Abstract This article explores the intersection between the professional politics of
medicine and national politics during the second Palestinian uprising, which erupted
in 2000. Through an analysis of stories about childbirth from actors in the birth
process—obstetricians, midwives and birth mothers—it examines two overlapping
movements that contributed to building the public health infrastructure, the
movement of sumud or steadfastness (1967–87) and the popular health movement
(1978–94), as well as their contemporary afterlife. Finally, it deals with relations
between medicine and governance through an analysis of the interpenetration of
medical and political authority. The birth stories bring to light two contrasting
visions of a nation in the context of restrictions on mobility and a ground chopped
up by checkpoints. The quasi-postcolonial condition of Palestine as popular con-
struct, institutional protostate organism, and the lived experience of its experts and
of its gendered subjects underlie the ethnographic accounts.
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Introduction
This article is intended to clarify the relationship between health and nation-
building in Palestine. Based primarily on interviews with professionals and
participant observation in hospitals and clinics, it examines two overlapping
movements that contributed to building the public health infrastructure in the
occupied Palestinian territories, including the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the
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Gaza Strip.1 The first is that of sumud (steadfastness), which took shape in the
period between the 1967 occupation by Israel of the West Bank and Gaza and the
outbreak of the first intifada (uprising) in December 1987.2 The second is that of
the popular health movement, which emerged in 1978 and flourished throughout the
pre-Oslo period, notably the years of the first intifada, lasting until 1994.3 The oral
histories themselves, however, are situated in their moments and places of telling,
namely, the second intifada, which erupted in 2000,4 with a ground now chopped up
by checkpoints and thus divided into isolated geographical minisections. Through
an analysis of the circulation of the oral histories, I show how medicine is a site
where political conflicts are played out. The article thus explores the intersection
between the professional politics of medicine and national politics in contemporary
Palestine.
Understanding the Field
I began my research in 2002, focusing on childbirth and everyday life in the central
West Bank (more particularly, the Ramallah and Jerusalem regions). I had come to
the field interested in the ways in which the conditions and experiences of birth had
changed during the second intifada, with its new restrictions on mobility, the closure
and a deepened economic crisis. The term ‘‘closure,’’ taskir in Arabic, requires
elucidation. Closure refers to the Israeli policy of separating Palestinian towns from
each other. It is a state of geographic isolation imposed over parts or all of the
occupied territories. Decreed by public or unannounced military orders, closures
may last a few hours, days, months or decades, depending on place. The separation
of Palestinian regions from one another is effected through the instrumentality of
military checkpoints. The Arabic word for checkpoint is hajiz (plural hawajiz),
although increasingly the Hebrew word mahsum (Arabized broken plural mahasim)
is used in popular parlance. The system thus consists of a policy—closure; a
modality—checkpoints; and an effect—isolation. Countervailing resistance strate-
gies have been predicated on sumud, or steadfastness, in the face of the policy,
argumentation to challenge the modality and ruse to break the isolation.
Psychologically and economically, communal agency is directed toward self-
reliance.
1 Israel’s internationally recognized borders are those of June 4, 1967, preceding the occupation of Arab
lands, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
2 The intifada, or so-called revolution of the stones, broke out in Jabalia refugee camp, the largest one in
Gaza, and quickly spread to the rest of the occupied territories. It was a mass movement that eschewed the
resort to weapons. Within months, Israel and the international community had accepted that there would
have to be changes made to the status of the Palestinians.
3 The ‘‘Oslo accords’’ were signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on
September 13, 1993, on the White House lawn, and the autonomy regime they called for entered into
force the following summer.
4 This uprising, the so-called al-Aqsa intifada, differed from the first one in the Palestinians’ willingness
to resort to violence in their quest for national self-determination.
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The process of imposing long-term closures by means of roadblocks began
during the 1991 Gulf War when free access to Jerusalem was interrupted, never to
be reinstated. Indeed, it was systematized at the very time the government of Prime
Minister Yizhak Shamir and the Palestinian delegation headed by Dr. Haidar
Abd-al-Shafi began to meet following the Madrid Peace Conference. During the
early and mid-1990s, when negotiations with Palestinians appeared to show that
they might culminate in the creation of a Palestinian state, it became important for
the Israeli government to isolate Jerusalem from the rest of the occupied territories,
thus establishing facts on the ground by precluding its consideration for sharing
between the parties. Hence the initial importance of checkpoints, which were set up
on all main roads leading to Jerusalem and, following a similar logic, then also
separated Gaza from Israel and thus the West Bank, mandating special permits to go
back and forth. In 1994, after the massacre of Palestinians in the Hebron Ibrahimi
mosque and the subsequent first Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel, closures
were further strengthened and geographically broadened (to include Jericho, Jenin,
Nablus, Ramallah and so on, for varying periods of time). Having begun as the
closure of a vital city (Jerusalem), the policy was in a sense inverted, and came to
encompass the occupied territories as a whole.
Since September 2000, the Israeli army, intent on crushing the intifada, has
generalized the use of hundreds of checkpoints throughout the occupied territories,
making it as difficult to go from one village to another as it had long been to get to
Jerusalem. Types and length of closures vary depending on place and time. But all
West Bank roads are dotted with checkpoints. During periods of heightened military
activities, closures were accompanied by blanket curfews, imposed and lifted over
time and in various places, thus applying the policy to all outside space for
Palestinians in the occupied territories (but only rarely in occupied East Jerusalem).
During the two major military incursions into Ramallah in 2002, it was risky to
stand indoors in front of a window while the city was under curfew. During a July
curfew, on the other hand, children could play soccer in the streets. The term closure
in Palestinian public discourse, and also in military practice, thus encompasses a
graded set of measures. Historically they began with the placing of Jerusalem and
Israel out of bounds, and were thus closures of destinations. As we have seen, they
became, by stages, closures of places of residence, towns or even houses (when
curfews were in force). Checkpoints (and, in the case of curfews, mobile military
patrols) were the means whereby these policies were carried out.
In this context, it depends very much on the ID or passport one holds, whether, to
what extent and at what speed one may pass through the checkpoints and move
through the occupied territories. The most effective document is a foreign passport,
as long as the family (and, to a lesser extent, the first) name is not an Arabic one, in
which case one falls into a less privileged category. After that comes the Jerusalem
ID, held by Palestinians officially residing in greater Jerusalem (the area annexed
following the 1967 occupation). Next comes the West Bank ID, and finally, Gaza.
There is also a fluctuating order of priority, as between West Bank regions,
depending on whether and where collective punishment is being imposed for
security infractions. Since I held a foreign passport, it remained possible for me, to a
certain extent and in the absence of curfews, to move through the maze.
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Individuals, Institutions and Networks
When I first started exploring birth and medicine during the closure, people spoke to
me about particular social and medical movements that were understood to be at the
heart of the health infrastructure in Palestine. I had expected to be confronted more
directly with state practices (be it those of the occupation or of the Palestinian
Authority [PA]) and the formation of individual subjectivities. Instead, I was struck
by the importance people attached to movements as units crucial to understanding
the medical component of the ongoing history of Palestinian state- and nation-
building.
It is for this reason that I decided to start by engaging with the particular set of
social movements and health care. What I present here is ethnographic material
regarding two movements that have yet to be written about in any depth. The
interviews in this article5 were gathered at a major hospital in East Jerusalem and at
a clinic and homes in the Ramallah area.
These overlapping movements in the Palestinian medical infrastructure, sumud
and the popular health movement, are remembered as important moments in the
history of the resistance against occupation and the process of nation-building
(Cousin 2000; Barghouti 2005). While the interviewees were describing moments in
the past, their accounts were interspersed with the experience of the situation on the
ground at the time of their telling.
Institutionally speaking, I focused on two principal venues, Makassed Hospital
and the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC). Whereas
Makassed represents an urban, technological model of health, the UPMRC, by
contrast, symbolizes a decentralized, grassroots one. They nonetheless present clear
parallels in their interpenetration with the political sphere at the ideological level,
despite widely differing articulations of the nation, but also in their very structures,
hierarchies and even leadership styles.
One of the main themes that the oral histories point to is the relationship between
medicine and governance. Most of the literature on this topic has focused on the
ways in which medical practices and discourses have produced different regimes of
health and control. This scholarship has examined the production of medical
knowledge in the construction of differences of race, gender and sexuality (Stoler
1995, 2002), the emergence of medical specializations in the metropolis applied to
the study of the colonies (Arnold 1993), medicine as a site involved in the
production of a gendered nationalist discourse (Ginsburg and Rapp 1995; Inhorn
1996; Kahn 2000; Kanaaneh 2002) and recourse to the discourse of objectivity and
science to justify political leadership (Adams 1998). In this piece, I focus instead on
interactions between the medical profession and the Palestinian political authority
through the construction of institutions, movements and networks. The presentation
5 I conducted and taped 56 formal long interviews: with 20 birth mothers, 13 doctors/ public health
officials, and 23 midwives/nurses/dayat. I also collected about 50 newspaper pieces about birth from two
Palestinian daily newspapers, Al-Quds and Al-Ayyam. Most of the interviews were conducted in peoples’
homes and offices. In addition, as part of my participant observation work, I carried out research and
interviews at the labor units of Al-Makassed Hospital in Jerusalem and the Red Crescent Hospital in
Ramallah. I have used pseudonyms for all the doctors and midwives I interviewed for this piece.
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of the two cases reveals the ways in which doctors mobilized politically, and
explores the question, ‘‘How is it that the figure of the doctor converged with that of
the sovereign?’’
Some of the answers to this question lead us through the history of governance.
Michel Foucault has been the paramount influence in shaping the understanding of
ways in which biology, medicine and governance interact. Foucault’s (2004)
concept of governmentality designates a distinctly modern form of rule that aims to
govern more efficiently by rendering individuals capable of augmenting their own
welfare. It has three interrelated elements: government, or the management of
population; discipline, which concerns practices and techniques of rule; and
sovereignty, that is, territory and laws. Building on Foucault’s formulation of
biopower and focusing on the third of these elements, Giorgio Agamben links the
amalgamation of sovereign and medical power in Europe to the ‘‘biologized’’ notion
of rights that emerged at the time of the French revolution. He argues that, with the
postrevolutionary body becoming the site of rights from the moment of birth—that
is, when the body became the ground of sovereign subjects—the sovereign is
partially displaced by another figure, the doctor, the one responsible for the care of
the body (Agamben 1998).
In his dissertation on doctors and sovereignty in Syria from the mid-19th to the
early 20th century, Robert Blecher (2002) shows that in the Middle East, the notion
of individual rights has a different genealogy specific to the region’s history.
Blecher demonstrates first of all that Ottoman governmentality differed from its
European equivalent insofar as it departed from the fixation on the individual. The
European state appeared to retract itself from certain realms to create seemingly
‘‘emancipated zones’’ where ‘‘individual rights’’ were articulated through ‘‘civil
society.’’ In the Ottoman Levant, by contrast, which included greater Syria and thus
Palestine, Blecher identifies the new ‘‘social networks’’ of the early 20th century as
crucial units with historical importance. These urban, civic, gender-based, national
and professional groups of social actors may have been tied to the state but
remained autonomous. Yet, despite this difference in focus, European governmen-
tality, like its Ottoman variety, was mainly designed to protect the interests of the
population. In the colonial context, on the other hand, European states used
techniques of governmentality as tools of coercion in ways that violated
metropolitan norms. Ottoman and post-Ottoman societies thus differ markedly
from both Western and colonial models.
This important insight tends to suggest the need to view the Palestinian case (and
probably others as well) in a particular light, one differing from standard academic
treatment. Ever since Ernest Renan ([1882] 1998:32) and, more recently, Benedict
Anderson (1991), the structural relationship that establishes the national entity has
been seen as that which links the individual and the state, passing through the
workings of print capitalism. While this triangle is relevant, it would seem that in
post-Ottoman societies, there are other dimensions to be taken into consideration. In
this context, professional corporations emerged from a social context in which,
historically, nation building was not on the agenda. The historiography points
overwhelmingly in the direction of continued loyalty to the Ottoman state in the
Arab East until the outbreak of World War I. Therefore, and although we are
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dealing with a simultaneously colonial and postcolonial context in Palestine, very
specific, deeply entrenched sociopolitical elements have carried over from an earlier
period in the medical sphere among others.
Arguably the most important body of work on colonial and postcolonial subjects
has been carried out by the Subaltern Studies Group—whose historians have sought
to recover subaltern subjectivity from the various epistemologies that have erased it
(Spivak 1988). Building on Foucault’s concepts, they pay close attention to the
relationship between the state and the subaltern focusing on India (Guha 1988) but,
in the process, establishing a model with many applications. In this spirit, Blecher
shows that in the Middle East, networks and groups of individuals having similar
characteristics (professional, charitable, civic, gender-based) need collectively to be
understood as an additional actor not encompassed within the colonial and
anticolonial dialectic and, therefore, as a unit of analysis endowed with historical
agency.
It is with this specific analytical configuration in mind (neither metropolitan nor
colonial) that the present piece explores the slow process whereby deeply rooted
affinity groups and networks became an essential element of the still ongoing state-
and nation-building process. In the light of these perspectives, and through an
analysis of the functioning and role of the two models, I show that the medical
profession is deeply intertwined with political authority, from the base to the apex of
the pyramid of power.
Two Contrasting Models of the Nation
The first model of the nation is embedded in stories about the medical infrastructure
and birth, as represented by Makassed Hospital in Jerusalem, the Palestinian
hospital par excellence. The hospital can be seen as a microcosm of the successful
nation, with its competent leader and spokesperson, the doctor; its hard-working,
sacrificing citizens, the nurse, midwife and technician; its modern organization,
sophisticated technology, successful operation, clean building and transparent
financing.
The envisioned nation is here a classical Jacobin one: a centralized, republican
nation in which the elites are chosen by the people and reflect the general will. It is
also a positivist vision of the nation, in that technology provides the means for the
solution to all social problems. This technocratic construct is based on a Western
ideology with science at the apex of the system.
The second series of interviews, those concerned with the UPMRC and its
afterlives, presents an alternate microcosm, based on a social-formations concept in
which the Palestinian nation cannot be divorced from society and its components.
Proponents of this model integrate all of the contradictions—notably those of
class—in striving to extend the benefits of primary health care from the single
institution of the hospital to the villages, camps and towns of Palestine in the form
of clinics. This socially based vision of the nation incorporates the lessons of the
socialist model, not as it was, but as it ‘‘should’’ have been practiced. Implicit in this
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articulation of the nation through an alternative health system is the effort to save
the socialist model by radically restructuring it.
As will be seen, both of these visions engendered internal dissent. In the end,
both adopted vertical and paternalistic forms of operation. Implicitly the stories call
for a considerable restructuring of the two visions of the nation.
Sumud at Makassed Hospital in Jerusalem
Genealogies of Sumud
Makassed sits on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem. It has a capacity of 250 beds,
about 45 percent of the hospital beds in East Jerusalem, and is staffed by 560
employees. It has nine departments of medicine. The department of obstetrics and
gynecology is known throughout Palestine. In addition to normal and high-risk
obstetric care, it provides gynecological surgery and has a well-known infertility
and perinatology clinic. It is the main teaching hospital for doctors, specialists,
midwives and nurses. It is affiliated with the first Palestinian medical school,
established in 1994 at Al-Quds University. Prior to that time, all medical students
were obliged to study and train outside of the country. Since 1988 Makassed also
has provided a 4-year specialization program in obstetrics, where general
practitioners train to be obstetricians and to pass the Jordanian Board Certification
exam. Whereas up until the 1990s Makassed received patients from all over the
occupied territories, with the tight closure6 of Jerusalem, most Palestinians from the
West Bank no longer have access to this referral hospital, and it mainly serves
Palestinians from the immediate area. Since it is a nongovernmental, albeit
charitable, hospital, the cost of treatment is considerably higher than at government
institutions (which have been free of charge for childbirth services since the
outbreak of the second intifada) but cheaper than equivalent services in the private
sector. In addition, Makassed offers reduced costs according to household income.
Many members of the professional elite obtain treatment there, as do poorer people.
With its impressive technologies, its interest in medical education, its diverse
clientele and its universalist aspirations, it is a working symbol of the Palestinian
national movement’s dreams.
In the early days of my research, I went to speak with a prominent obstetrician at
Makassed, Dr. Rami. When I asked him what Makassed Hospital was like, he
described its history as being intimately linked with that of sumud. The sumud
policy of the PLO promoted a type of nonviolent resistance whereby Palestinians
under occupation received material support from external sources as they endured
difficult military and political measures and a harsh economic situation for the sake
of their national future. The PLO and Arab governments sent funds to support local
industries and services, thereby sustaining living conditions in the occupied
6 The issue of the progressive closure imposed on the occupied territories, whose nature, intent and
phases are sketched out above, has never been treated in a systematic fashion, although it is, yet today,
arguably the most visible element of everyday life in Palestine.
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territories. This was a response and challenge to the poor government services
offered by the Israeli military’s ‘‘civil administration,’’ which controlled govern-
mental health and educational institutions, in addition to various other offices.7
The sumud approach was rooted in Arab and Palestinian nationalism, which
understood colonialism and military rule to be the major causes of poverty and the
major obstacle to development. Sumud-linked donations were supposed to alleviate
poverty and encourage Palestinians to stay put. In 1978 Arab leaders officially
started the pan-Arab fund, amwal al-sumud, to be administered jointly by Jordan
and the PLO, and called on Palestinians in the occupied territories to be samidin
(steadfast).
Dr. Rami and other physicians, when discussing the genealogy of funding
sources (well known throughout the country but regarding which there are very few
records due to the illegal status of the PLO prior to 1993), were signaling the
institution’s connection to sumud, a source of prestige. The Arab states, through the
sumud fund, had, they believed, been infusing the body social and thus the body
politic with the means to survive, while different forms of resistance would hasten
the demise of the occupation. Like the PLO itself, then, the hospital had seen a
succession of donors in keeping with the ebb and flow of international politics. With
its leadership and departments, Makassed was a microcosm of the ‘‘virtual state’’
and would someday fuse with it.
Makassed was one of the Palestinian hospitals considered financially stable. Dr.
Rami explained that it had large debts but managed to cover salaries every month
through received donations (another demonstration of sumud). At the time of our
initial encounter in 2002, employees of the hospital had in fact not received salaries
for a few months. According to Dr. Rami, this was a problem of liquidity, based
simply on the delays caused by Israel and the PA in clearing the donations and
passing them on to the hospital. The institution’s continued limited resources and
liquidity problems, however, suggested that it was not as stable financially as some
portrayed it. It continued, nonetheless, with the payment of salaries, even when
these were late in coming, something very few large institutions such as the
universities could claim (World Bank 2003:45). Furthermore, the symbolic and
historical importance of the hospital in Palestinian national thinking made it difficult
to imagine that it may in fact have been in financial crisis or teetering on the edge of
bankruptcy, just as the permanence of the PLO had, through thick and thin, been
deemed axiomatic. Unlike the private hospitals that started to sprout in the mid-
1990s and were then subject to the whims of economic and political changes,
Makassed, it appeared, had the stability of a national infrastructure. In fact, while it
had indeed managed to stay afloat over the years, the multiple changes in sources of
funding illustrated the unstable political conditions with which Palestinian
institutions had to cope. Describing the source of sumud funds, Dr. Rami noted:
7 Between 1967 and 1994, the Palestinian health system was under the control of Israel’s defense
ministry, with the Officer for Health playing the role of minister. At public institutions, his prerogatives
included the payment of salaries and the hiring and firing of Palestinian medical personnel, as well as the
setting of health policies. The actual health providers were Palestinians.
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It has been funded regularly since its beginnings in 1968. Before the Gulf War,
most of the funding came from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. After 1991, it had to
depend more on other Gulf countries like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.
Since the Palestinian leadership sided against the US and its allies during the
Gulf War, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia took away their funding. But other Gulf
countries replaced them.
Makassed thus managed to weather the 1991 Gulf War and had had clear sailing
through the 1993–2000 Oslo period, thanks to sumud funds.
The majority of nationalists had, for some time prior to Oslo, espoused the
politics of sumud across political and professional sectors. According to the
ideology of the time, real and lasting solutions to health problems could only be
achieved with a just and durable resolution of the political crisis. In the meantime,
however, the development of a Palestinian infrastructure within the limits imposed
by Israeli military laws and practices was the aim. Palestinian administrators thus
agreed to fight for permits and licenses in the offices of the Israeli military governor,
for the renewal or inception of each project. Some applications were denied, others
granted. But an inherent principle of the politics of sumud was to act in the open,
and thus, with the toleration of the occupier, department after department were
created and staffed.
Leaders and activists thus set up the basic infrastructure of Palestinian curative
services in the occupied territories. They bought medical technologies and
developed expertise. Other Palestinian hospitals also tended to be large, bureau-
cratic and located in urban areas; although most of them did not possess the means
to do so, they aspired to sophisticated technologies and specialized services.
Makassed was ‘‘as good and advanced as Israeli hospitals,’’ Dr. Rami said with
pride.
Practices of Sumud
Arab leaders gave the concept of sumud a prominent place in political discourse
regarding Palestine, even as Palestinians in the occupied territories were reading
new meanings into it, thus carving a niche for themselves in official politics. In fact,
Palestinians in the territories (occupied in 1967) and in Israel had been speaking of
sumud as a form of daily politics for a much longer time. Its purpose was to enable
them to endure, clinging to their homes, their lands and their activities. In his
published journal The Third Way, Raja Shehadeh (1982:viii),8 author and human
rights lawyer, writes of the everyday practices of sumud:
Long before Arab politicians outside defined sumud as a pan-Arab objective, it
had been practiced by every man, woman and child here struggling on his or
her own to learn to cope with, and resist, the pressures of living as a member
of a conquered people. Sumud is watching your home turned into a prison.
8 The distinction between ‘‘static sumud’’ and ‘‘resistance sumud’’ (sumud muqawim) is found here and
there in the literature (Farsoun and Landis 1990:28).
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You, Samid, choose to stay in that prison, because it is your home, and
because you fear that if you leave, your jailer will not allow you to return.
Living like this, you must constantly resist the twin temptations of either
acquiescing in the jailer’s plan in numb despair, or becoming crazed by
consuming hatred for your jailer and yourself, the prisoner. It is from this
personal basis that sumud for us, in contrast with politicians outside, is
developing from an all-encompassing form of life into a form of resistance
that unites the Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.
For many people like Dr. Rami in Palestine, sumud is ‘‘practiced’’ in everyday
life.
Dr. Rami’s description of Makassed as a sumud institution not only classified it
as a PLO-related organization, but described practices of everyday life under
occupation.9 Dealing with obstacles on the road and at work was seen as living the
politics of sumud. The hospital partook of sumud whether with regard to its links,
roots and funding or in terms of the everyday practices of doctors and employees.
Perseverance in the face of difficulties in getting to work around roadblocks and
despite the discontinuity of care due to the closure exemplified practices of sumud.
While Makassed always had patients, it was difficult for doctors to anticipate where
these would be coming from, and whether there would be an avalanche or a dearth
thereof. Since the beginning of the prolonged closure in the early 1990s, patients
from the Gaza Strip had been extremely rare because they were not given permits to
travel. But even from the West Bank, the numbers fluctuated. The first phase of
closure targeted Jerusalem, so patients started going to hospitals in other towns.
After Ramallah was reoccupied by the Israeli military in 2002, those who could do
so returned to Jerusalem. People living in surrounding villages such as Hizma,
Anata and Abu Dis, and some in the Ramallah and Bethlehem areas, found it easier
to get to Jerusalem than to the nearest town.10 Everything seemed to depend on the
constellation of the closure. ‘‘We always have patients, but the question is from
where and how many?’’ I would have added to Dr. Rami’s question: What effect did
this repeated reshuffling of patient populations and staff have on the quality and
continuity of care?
Dr. Rami continued:
My patient from Ras Karkar [a village close to Ramallah], she comes here like
many because she has high-risk pregnancies. She had two previous cesareans
and suffers from diabetes. She thought it would be easier to drive 40 km to
Jerusalem than to get to Ramallah. We set up an appointment for the
C-section. She was unable to cross the checkpoint that day. She arrived
knocking at my door four days later. I had to stop everything, because her case
was getting dangerous.
9 Women in Lebanon used the PLO’s sumud discourse to give political value to their daily activities of
housework and child-rearing (Peteet 1991).
10 In the meantime, with the near-completion of the high wall around and within Jerusalem, the lines of
communication have shifted once again, and it is very hard even for Palestinians from the immediate
surroundings to get in, if they come from the ‘‘wrong’’ side of the separation wall.
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My ongoing observations indicated that this was the precarious way in which
much medical care had to be dispensed and many births assisted in Palestinian
hospitals. The medical practices learned as routines were no longer practicable in
this unpredictable situation. Only rarely had medical providers seen a particular
woman prior to her arrival, already in labor. Now they barely had time to get
background information about the mother. It was difficult to know who would come
to work and who wouldn’t, which patient would arrive and which one wouldn’t, but
the hospital continued to function and to adapt. Working and managing a hospital
under these conditions was experienced as part of the living politics of sumud.
Employees were never sure they would reach the hospital. A resident in the
anesthesia department whom Dr. Rami drove to and from Ramallah first had to take
a five-hour drive from Tulkarem. And Dr. Rami himself was not much better off.
‘‘For two weeks I could not come to work. A doctor here took my place during that
time. But it is still a mess. And can you imagine the road every day?’’
I could imagine it. During this phase of my fieldwork, I often traveled the road
that Dr. Rami took every day, and could have collected many of my own stories of
waiting, standing in line, delays, frustration and not understanding the logic. Passing
Qalandia, the main checkpoint between Ramallah and Jerusalem, had been a
strenuous and lengthy affair since the spring of 2001. Pedestrians—whether
peasants, workers, doctors, lawyers or butchers—all lined up in the dust of a
rundown road to get their IDs checked by the soldier. The alternative was to take a
roundabout road. It was long, and people, especially men, ran the risk of being
arrested. Most therefore went through Qalandia checkpoint. Things changed
somewhat with the beginning of the construction of the wall, when unofficial roads
(al-turuq al-sha’biah, or peoples’ roads, as they are known) were progressively
choked off, and the turnstiles modernized. The waiting was the same, the frustration
perhaps greater (because of dwindling options) and the noise and dust pollution
levels still very high.
Closure stories have become a communal account that refugees, returnees,11
urban and rural people, men and women, poor and wealthy all share. This is not to
say that the effects of the closure are the same for all Palestinians regardless of class.
However, the politics of the closure, the delays, standing in line, waiting,
surveillance, being refused entry and being under curfew in your home, as well as
breaking the closure regulation, bypassing the checkpoint on winding dirt roads or
slipping out after sunset during curfew days, are lived, told and remembered as
communal, as the story of a whole people, and are part of the discourse of sumud,
especially when the destination is the hospital that symbolizes a lifeline of the nation.
Beginnings
The very creation of Makassed Hospital represented a victory for the Palestinian
national movement and is emblematic of remaining steadfast. ‘‘There are two events
11 The term ‘‘returnees’’ designates Palestinians from the diaspora, usually belonging to the PLO in exile,
who came to the occupied territories with Yasser Arafat in 1994 or thereafter.
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in the hospital’s history that single it out as the most important hospital in the
occupied territories,’’ Dr. Rami remarked.
In 1964, the Al-Makassed Foundation started building a hospital on the Mount
of Olives in Jerusalem…. In 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and
Gaza, the hospital was being built on land owned by the Islamic Awqaf
[religious endowment fund]. Right after the occupation of Jerusalem, the
Israeli army decided to expropriate the still empty hospital building and
transform it into a police station. Hundreds of doctors and nurses mobilized.
They moved beds, equipment and even patients from private clinics and
homes into Makassed premises and stayed in the hospital. The Israeli
authorities gave up control of the building.12
The Makassed Foundation had just finished building the hospital at the time of
the occupation. By filling the building with beds and equipment, doctors and nurses
unofficially inaugurated the hospital at the beginning of occupation, and this takes
on foundational importance. The official inauguration was not until 1968. Its initial
movement against occupation, according to Dr. Rami, made a name for Makassed
right from the start.
The 1987 intifada secured the hospital’s position as an emblem of Palestinian
nationalism.
By early 1988, government hospitals were inundated with injured persons. These
were controlled by the Israeli so-called ‘‘Civil Administration,’’ under the aegis
of the ministry of defense. Their services were not sufficient. So the injured from
all over the occupied territories, from Gaza in the south to Jenin in the north,
flocked to Makassed. There were no checkpoints at that time. The roads were
easy. Furthermore, the hospital specializes in high-tech, complicated, emer-
gency surgery. And, like many other hospitals, intifada injuries were treated free
of charge. Makassed became the most prominent Palestinian hospital.
The hospital’s foundation story in 1967 resembles popular stories about what
happened to the entire country when it came under occupation. It is a story about
waking up to the necessity of joining the struggle, an impulsive awakening. It is the
year the PLO opted for Fatah’s historical insistence on steering clear of Arab
nationalism of any stripe and concentrating on the Palestinian project. The decisive
victory of the Palestinian over the Arab nationalist program resulted from the battle
of Karameh of March 1968, in which Israeli forces withdrew after an onslaught onto
a Fatah military camp in Jordan, suffering relatively heavy casualties. Yasir Arafat
had personally, and against the advice of many of his peers, insisted on standing
firm rather than opting for a tactical withdrawal. For the Palestinians and the Arabs,
the battle of Karameh was the beginning of a comeback after the humiliating defeat
of the Six-Day War of June 1967 (Sayigh 1997).
Nineteen sixty-seven is usually narrated as the quintessential story of loss
followed by an awakening and then civil disobedience. Makassed’s successful sit-in
was the nonviolent Karameh. Furthermore, since it was carried out by the
12 For another account of this event, see Barghouthi and Giacaman (1990).
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Palestinians under occupation and without resort to arms, it is part of the history of
the everyday practices of sumud.
The late Palestinian author Ghassan Kanafani wrote his novel Returning to Haifa
(1969) about the events and psychological/political effects of 1967. It is about Said
S., originally from Haifa, who is a refugee in Ramallah. He lives comfortably in a
nice house, forbids his children to become fighters and waits for the day he can
return to the home he was expelled from in 1948. In the rush to flee Haifa in 1948,
this man and his wife were unable to take their first child with them. Suddenly,
19 years later, when Israel occupied the West Bank, Said S. had the opportunity to
travel to Israel, visit the house and inquire about his firstborn, Khaled. In the house,
he found an Israeli couple living with their 20-year-old son, Dov. The couple had
found Khaled/Dov and adopted him. Said realized that his son was an Israeli, served
in the army and did not want to have anything to do with his Arab or Palestinian
identity. On his car drive back to Ramallah, he realizes that he must renounce even
blood ties for the sake of the struggle and wishes that his other son had joined the
resistance. Kanafani’s novel is about a middle-aged man’s awakening to the need to
struggle, the common experience of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza after
the June 1967 occupation.13
Makassed’s foundation story of 1967 is also about an awakening and the impulse
to join the struggle against occupation. The doctors and nurses joined the resistance
by bringing their equipment and sitting in on the hospital grounds. They, like
Shehadeh’s samid, chose ‘‘to stay in that prison.’’ Makassed is here a microcosm of
Palestine. For Dr. Rami, the story about childbirth in Palestine started with the
history of the medical system, and the medical system conveyed his worldview. As
will be seen later, the midwives and nurses, on the other hand, rarely recounted this
history without being asked about it specifically. They usually began by talking
about issues of work, labor relations and everyday life.
The Midwife: Rebellious Intermediary
As I was chatting with the midwives in the nurses’ room, a young midwife walked
in singing and waving her purse. She took off her veil, tied her hair up, wiped the
sweat off her face and said: ‘‘The service taxi took the Tora Bora road but we have
our salaries!’’ Tora Bora designates a mountainous, winding dirt road people took to
avoid checkpoints. It is of course a reference to the Tora Bora caves in Afghanistan,
where the American army was searching for Bin Laden. Seven Makassed midwives
had sent Ruba to the Bank of Palestine in Ramallah to pick up their salaries. ‘‘The
heat, the sweat and the wait at Qalandia checkpoint on the way to Ramallah! That
was something,’’ Ruba said. ‘‘And the return was through the stone quarries.’’
In the interviews midwives granted me,14 they wanted to make sure that their
working conditions would be part of the story I would write. The discussion of
13 For a discussion of Kanafani in the culture of Palestinian resistance, see Harlow (1996).
14 I conducted 23 formal interviews with midwives (qabilat), traditional birth attendants (dayat) and
labor unit nurses (mumarridat).
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hospital practices shifted from the treatment of the histories and practices of sumud,
human and financial, to that of sumud and intra- or interprofessional struggle. From
their perspective, the hospital is far from being the ideal nation and the doctor far
from being the competent leader and spokesperson. One midwife told me that if I
wanted to learn about childbirth in this hospital, I needed to know how many hours
they worked per week, how much money they made and how often they got to see
their families. Through telling their own version of the childbirth story, they
readjusted the version they correctly presumed I had gotten from the doctor a few
days earlier.
Samia explained to me:
Makassed is late in paying its employees. It has happened before. But this time
we have not been paid for 3 months. It is the longest time without pay I can
remember. Today, they paid us. We get more or less 1000 NIS [New Israeli
Shekels; about $250] per month. So they should not do this to us. We cannot
afford to wait 3 months for our wages. We have bills to pay and children to
raise. This makes it impossible for us to live regular and stable lives.
According to Samia and Ruba, the reason midwives at Makassed had been
overworked since the beginning of the second intifada was that the number of births
there had increased. Midwives assist all ‘‘normal’’ vaginal births at most hospitals in
the occupied territories. Hence, more births in their hospital meant more work for
them. ‘‘We midwives [at Makassed] usually deliver 200 babies per month. But since
the closure we have been delivering 300. Since the tough closure on Ramallah and
Bethlehem, it has become easier to come all the way to Jerusalem from neighboring
villages than to go to a neighboring town.’’
Samia gave an additional explanation for the rise in births at Makassed:
‘‘Palestinians from Jerusalem are now afraid to go to Jewish hospitals. Many people
with blue [Jerusalem] IDs15 used to deliver in Hadassah or other Israeli hospitals.
But many women now tell me they don’t want to go there. There are rumors that
Arabs receive different treatment than Jews.’’ Ruba, the midwife, talked about the
same suspicions: ‘‘Because of the political situation, [Palestinian] women from
Jerusalem are now afraid to go to Israeli hospitals. They say, ‘You don’t know what
they will do to me. Will they take revenge on me or my newborn? We don’t know
how we’ll be treated.’’’ These stories were clearly specific to the residents of
Jerusalem, where women could choose to go to hospitals across the ‘‘Green Line’’16
into West Jerusalem. In fact, the increase in hospital births in 2002 was specific to
the city of Jerusalem. In other West Bank cities, such as Ramallah, staff at some
hospitals spoke of a radical decrease in the number of births, even of empty labor
rooms during the curfews (conversation with midwives at Ramallah and Hebron
hospitals).
15 Palestinians from Jerusalem have blue identification cards, like Israelis and Palestinians born within
the pre-1967 borders of Israel. Palestinians from the occupied territories (excluding Jerusalem) hold
orange or green IDs. The difference in the color of the Israeli ID cards is in itself a statement about which
future nation Jerusalem (with, or for, the occupier, preferably without its blue ID-holding Palestinians)
should belong to.
16 The borders of Israel prior to the occupation of 1967.
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In addition to an increase in the number of births, the labor room at Makassed
had fewer staff. There were usually 16 midwives. Two had recently resigned. ‘‘With
so few midwives and so many births we can no longer work the way we used to.
Now we cannot attend to many of the important aspects of midwifery care.’’
Sometimes, they didn’t have time to shower women after delivery or to show them
how to breastfeed. They went on rounds from one woman to the next, doing no more
than the basic medical checkup.
Their stories about the closure intersected with those of the doctors. However,
unlike the doctor, midwives saw working conditions as the most important feature
of their professional existence. The actual doing of birth assistance constitutes the
major part of the professional identity of midwifery. They take pride in assisting
births and contrast this with the doctor, who ‘‘walks in the delivery room when the
work is all over’’ (communication with a midwife at another hospital). The doctor
had here been identified as belonging to a privileged elite whose self-ascribed role is
based on the labor of others. It was important for the midwives to emphasize that the
hospital was not the ideal entity it presented itself to be. All was not organized,
rational and smoothly productive. Sumud was a recurring theme among midwives,
but it had acquired a new, social and subaltern tonality in addition to the nationalist
slant taken for granted. They too felt that their steadfastness was directed toward the
political predicament in which the occupation in general, and the system of closures
in particular, had placed them. But they also felt that it was a matter of continuing to
work in the face of conditions for which the Palestinian employer was also
responsible. This form of sumud paralleled the combined national and social
objectives of the 2000 intifada as a whole, directed as it was against the occupation
and against a ruling clique by whom they felt exploited (Heacock 2008).
Another difference midwives pointed to between their profession and that of
doctors was their closeness to a Palestinian social base and women’s apparent
preference for female birth attendants.17 Describing her previous job in Ramallah,
Samia explained how birth mothers demanded that midwives rather than obstetri-
cians assist their births. Opening in the mid-1990s, the hospital in question was part
of the expanding private sector that emerged amid the hopes of looming peace and a
rising economy. It vaunted its specialized, personalized and luxurious services,
targeting women who could afford the fees. The novelty of this maternity hospital
was that obstetricians assisted normal births instead of midwives.
According to Samia,18 midwives were dissatisfied with their secondary role despite
the good salary, as they could not provide midwifery care according to their vision of
the profession. She for one decided to leave and go to Makassed. However, this
Ramallah hospital was soon forced to change its policy due to lack of clientele, and
permitted midwives to attend normal births upon a woman’s request. Her story points
to one of the main arguments midwives continue to make to the ministry of health:
unlike doctors’ assistance at births, their work is grounded in popular demand.
17 According to the Palestinian Association of Obstetricians/Gynecologists, less than 10 percent of
obstetricians working in West Bank hospitals are females.
18 This story was repeated to me by a few midwives, including the head midwife at the hospital in
question.
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These stories reflect an increasingly visible tension between obstetricians and
midwives in Palestine. As is the case in many other parts of the world, the professions
of midwifery and obstetrics compete for the control of childbirth. However, in
contrast to other Arab countries in the Middle East (Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, for
example), midwives in the West Bank assist almost all complication-free hospital
births.19 While they do not have their own union (they belong to the nurses’ union,
headed by a male nurse) and are relatively low in the hierarchy of the hospital staff,
they exercise a certain power because of the shortage of midwives in Palestine.
Measures taken against the intifada, including closures and curfews, disrupted the
previous medical routine and organization of childbirth. This opened a space for
different groups to try to change and restructure childbirth assistance and health care
provision in general. Thus, it was not surprising to hear discussions about the
intensified rivalry between midwives and obstetricians. A midwife in a government
hospital said that I could witness ‘‘the age-old fight between midwives and
obstetricians here,’’ as she drew an obstetrician who was walking by into the
conversation. ‘‘They blame us for everything that goes wrong,’’ she said, ‘‘and we tell
them, ‘You can start talking when you start doing the work.’ We do all the births. Even
with complicated births, we stay with the woman until she is fully dilated. Then, at the
very end, the doctor comes in.’’ The obstetrician retorted that doctors have other
responsibilities such as operative deliveries, outpatient cases and gynecology cases.
In another interview, an obstetrician exclaimed, while he was explaining the
division of labor: ‘‘Midwives are mutinous! It is not like Europe and America.20
Here, midwives fight to get what they want. But the biggest problem for us is that in
the end, we are responsible for everything that goes on in the labor room. If there is
a problem or a mistake, the obstetricians are held accountable for it.’’
The doctor spoke of mutiny, of fighting, of responsibility and accountability.
While it has been noted by many that the language of medicine and birth is full of
metaphors from state and economic terminology, the wording in this simple
exchange on the workings of the labor room was very strong and reflected an
exacerbation of class tensions among different categories of health providers.
Thus, midwives’ narratives about work revolved around concepts of an everyday
struggle contained in the notion of sumud. However, they integrated into the idea of
sumud a critique of unacknowledged labor. Mirroring the political objectives of the
second intifada, they directed their critique at the occupation and at a ruling class.
Topographies of Sumud
At the most technologically advanced Palestinian hospital, Samia was not shy to say
that half of her work of birthing assistance was done on the phone. She told stories
resonating with experiences of health professionals throughout the occupied
territories. Samia recalled a woman telephoning from a village under curfew:
19 For a comparative description of policies and practices in Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, see
Choices and Challenges for Changing Childbirth Research Network (2005).
20 This doctor thought that in European and American hospitals, midwives did the nurses’ work and did
not have much say in the assistance of childbirth.
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‘‘Hello, I have contractions. I am afraid. I can’t go to a hospital. We are under
curfew,’’ the woman said. ‘‘How many contractions per minute?’’ I asked.
‘‘OK, take a shower and an Acamol [tylenol] and try to sleep until morning,
maybe you can find a way to come in the morning in daylight. But don’t
worry. Just don’t be afraid. If worst comes to worst I’ll guide you and your
family through delivery.’’ In another conversation the birthing woman says, ‘‘I
have pain. I feel contractions. I can’t wait anymore. The closure … I can’t
come. Help us!’’ So I got the birthing woman’s mother on the phone and tried
to take them through delivery. I explained how to clamp the umbilical cord, to
tie a string, to boil a pair of scissors and then cut the cord.
The phone birth was unexpected in a hospital in Jerusalem. It became relatively
common in areas under prolonged curfew. Through her accounts of phone-births,
Samia linked Jerusalem and the West Bank, which have been separated by the
closure. In her story, assisting phone-births challenged the closure,21 connected her
work to a resistant form of sumud and bound her and her profession to people in the
rest of Palestine.
These stories illuminate a tension between, on the one hand, the institutional,
imposed and, to a certain extent, lived separation of Jerusalem from the rest of
Palestine and, on the other hand, its unity and oneness with it, which is imagined
and willed, but also lived. The administrative and physical partition of Jerusalem
from the West Bank affected one of the centers of the midwives’ lives, their
families. Except for those few residents of Jerusalem, they now slept in the nurses’
quarters at the hospitals. In this way they avoided the difficult roads. But they were
unable to live with their families. They got one day off a week. And in order to
accumulate a few days’ leave, they worked for four weeks without a break. They
then went back to their hometown for four or five days.
Samia was 33, was divorced and had a daughter living in her village in the
Ramallah district. Samia had to stay in the nurses’ dorms at Makassed in order to
work. At the beginning of the intifada, she traveled to Jerusalem from her village
every morning. But that proved impossible to continue. She had night shifts,
sometimes two in a row. Then she moved to the nurses’ dorms and would go back to
see her daughter every two days. But the road was ‘‘crazy.’’ Then she started going
back every week. Even that became impossible during the long invasions of
Ramallah. So now she could not even go back every week. She no longer obtained
permits to come to Jerusalem. She was in Jerusalem illegally. ‘‘Maybe the army
thinks that because I am divorced and can’t see my daughter very often, I am angry
and may do something [violent]!’’ She felt guilty about not being able to see and
take care of her daughter. Samia called her as soon as she got off work, sometimes
wanting to quit her job. ‘‘But at least we bring money home. You know, I am always
laughing. My daughter gives me motivation to stand strong on earth.’’
The closure separated many midwives from their families. Phone-births and
medical assistance over the phone not only were a form of sumud but also re-united
21 One should note that other health professionals argue that coping mechanisms such as birth assistance
by phone serve the closure policies by minimizing pressure to end them.
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them with the people they left behind in the West Bank for a week while they came
to their workplaces.
In the above discussion I have illustrated the articulation of a particular vision of
the nation through the institution and the functioning of a Palestinian hospital,
Makassed, in Jerusalem. The nation is projected as a territorially unified entity
despite all measures taken to remove an essential portion of it, its capital. We have
here the first type of a nation, the unified, Jacobin, technocratic one, as envisaged by
the doctor and contested by the midwife in the name of the people. What the
midwives contested was the assertion by the doctor that this particular national
paradigm functioned smoothly and without major contradictions. Theirs were
stories of unpaid, malrespected labor, carried out essentially by women, whose
critiques combined a gender and class perspective. We are still within the first
paradigm of the centralized nation. Within this paradigm, the various categories of
health professionals live their daily travails as sumud, but with the nuance described
above. And, it has been seen, the term sumud is rather adaptable, depending on the
category of those within the national movement who apply it. Nonetheless, it fit into
a system in which the various actors bore their hardships and carried out their
responsibilities, not uncomplainingly, but without hesitation. Central authority may
be questioned openly, but within this model rebellion never means revolt. In the
section that follows, in which the popular health movement is discussed, the notion
of sumud is virtually absent, It was discarded in favor of a more proactive and
agential type of action in the face of occupation and then military assault during the
2000 intifada.
The Popular Health Movement: A Decentralizing Vision
Networking
The streets were empty. The stores were closed. The people were indoors. The only
sound the city made was the roaring of passing tanks. Ramallah was silent. Since
March 29, 2002, the Israeli army had imposed a curfew on Ramallah. For the first
2 months it was very strict. People never broke it. Every few days, the army lifted the
curfew for a few hours so that people could stock up on food. Later, the curfew was
less strict and was lifted more often. People sat on their verandas. Children played in
the streets. But at the intrusive sound of the tank, everyone went running inside.
On the morning of July 4, 2002, Ramallah was bustling. The whole city was in
the streets. Vegetable vendors, sandal and shoe sellers, shoppers and strollers
mingled in the middle of town. Political leaders and prisoners—Marwan al-
Barghouti,22 Ahmad Saadat23—as well as intifada martyrs—Wafa’ Idris,24
22 A home-grown, popular, elected West Bank leader sentenced to life imprisonment by Israel, head of
the militant Tanzim within Fatah, which contested the bureaucratic and corrupt leadership as well as the
occupation.
23 Leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
24 The first Palestinian woman suicide bomber.
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Muhammad al-Durra25—looked down from posters on the walls. There was not a
soldier in sight. Cell phones were ringing everywhere. Horns were honking. Radios
were blasting. Ramallah was loud; the curfew had been lifted.
In an office building at the center of town, Dr. Siham, an obstetrician, shared a
private clinic with a few other health professionals. The building was empty, the
door barely open. She was alone in her clinic, on the phone: ‘‘You’ll be fine. The
curfew is lifted until 2 P.M. You can stop by the clinic if you want, before then. But
I don’t think it’s necessary. Call me at home if you feel pain.’’ Dr. Siham turned to
me and said:
I would never have imagined that I would practice medicine by phone…. I
never thought I would wake up at 2 A.M. to phone calls from women in labor
and instruct the husband how to assist his wife in childbirth. I have never heard
of a time in history when even health providers were restricted in their
movements. But the thing is, life goes on. Women still become sick. Women
still become pregnant. They can impose a curfew, restrict mobility, but it does
not stop labor from starting. This is dangerous. This is frightening….
The phone rang again. It was another patient.
In between periods of medical advice given on the phone to her patients, Dr.
Siham told me stories about assisting birth by phone during curfew nights. She
explained that this instrument had become a crucial medium of medical assistance.
Since many women thought it better to give birth at home than to brave the curfew,
they would telephone health providers to get counseling during childbirth.
Dr. Siham’s stories centered around a movement of health professionals who had
mobilized to provide services to women who went into labor during curfews. ‘‘Sort
of naturally,’’ she said:
by the first days of the curfew, many health providers in the Ramallah area
would converse, share stories and give each other advice. Quickly and
spontaneously, we had a system working. Health providers would tell people
in need to call such and such a person to follow up on something. Those with
no experience with childbirth in a village under siege would call me so I could
give them training by phone…. Since the beginning of the long invasion we
have created a hotline to provide this network of medical services and advice,
so we can take many midwives, nurses and lay people through childbirth on
the phone.
The phone rang again and a few patients had come to her clinic. She talked to the
phone patient; then saw her clinic patients. In the midst of this chaos, expecting the
curfew to be reimposed any minute, she told me stories of an effective and active
‘‘childbirth network.’’ Here, stories traveled by phone and into my interviews to
construct the basis for what she called a network.
25 A child killed by Israeli gunfire in his father’s arms at the beginning of the second intifada, on
September 30, 2000.
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However, Dr. Siham’s use of the word ‘‘network’’ suggested that it had long-term
and administrative functions: ‘‘With this hotline and network,’’ Dr. Siham
explained:
we are also trying to convince women to have natural childbirth26 at home or
close to the woman’s home. That way, we can avoid the fear, humiliation and
danger of the road…. So, I try to convince women to forget about the hospital.
That it is safer for them to give birth close to where they live…. If we create a
system where women can give birth close to their homes, that is what I mean
by natural childbirth, then we would have succeeded in something extraor-
dinary for our political aspirations.
She wanted women to relocate their births from the urban hospital to their
villages in order to build a lasting decentralized infrastructure and make each
neighborhood self-sufficient.
After my initial interview with Dr. Siham, I talked to numerous doctors who had
assisted births during the closure. I asked whether they were part of the network she
had described and several responded clearly that they were not part of a network or
movement, that they were simply part of the infrastructure, doing their duty. They
distanced themselves from the term because of their disenchantment with political
movements, and perhaps because they disapproved of some of the personalities
involved in its leadership. By identifying themselves as part of the infrastructure,
they were telling me that the network as described was getting too much
recognition; that they, just as much as the people who said they were part of it, were
movers and shakers in the medical sector but not recognized in the same way. This
group of alienated doctors told stories with a plaintive tone about disrespected or
unrecognized labor and demand for change reminiscent of the midwives in the
hospital.
The Genealogy of Popular Health
By her use of the term ‘‘network’’ and reference to bringing ‘‘childbirth close to
women’s homes’’ or ‘‘into women’s neighborhoods,’’ Dr. Siham was placing the
childbirth network in the framework of an ideology, program and movement
intended to counter that of the PLO’s centralizing politics of sumud. She positioned
the childbirth network in the wake of the ‘‘popular health movement’’ that emerged
in the late 1970s.
Upon its establishment in the occupied territories in 1994, the PA continued
Israel’s and the PLO’s policies of supporting large, urban hospitals over community
clinics. And in terms of childbirth, the PA’s ministry of health instituted practices
designed to encourage women to give birth in hospitals. It reduced the costs of a
26 It became clear as her story proceeded that the meanings of ‘‘natural childbirth’’ for her were different
from the meanings attached to it in the West. Natural childbirth is not so much about giving birth without
technologies and drugs as about locating the birth in women’s neighborhoods rather than in large, urban
hospitals. Also, in the context of the Middle East, the term natural childbirth does not carry the same
history of a feminist movement attached to it elsewhere.
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normal birth in government hospitals to 100 NIS (approximately $40 at the time). It
also supervised the dayat (midwives with no formal certification who assist home
births) and permitted them to practice their profession but refused to license any
new midwives who wanted to assist home births. This resulted in the situation
whereby the dayat (who are for the most part old and will not be practicing much
longer) were licensed to attend home births, while qabilat, younger midwives with
formal training from midwifery schools, could only practice in hospitals. Through
these multiple strategies, the PA developed a strong, centralized system of hospitals
and discouraged women from giving birth in their homes or neighborhoods.27
The popular health movement emerged more than a decade before the arrival of
the PA, in the late 1970s. Dr. Siham explained that it had taken shape quite
spontaneously, in a manner reminiscent of the childbirth network she now saw
emerging. She had started in the movement by offering a few hours a week of
voluntary work in mobile clinics, treating patients for free. She and a group of
physicians would drive around in their cars to villages providing consultations, with
equipment and medication donated by local pharmacies and companies. Later,
villagers offered them a room in the village to set up a permanent clinic. The
physicians would rotate, offering one day a week of voluntary service. Very soon
Dr. Siham became a leading figure in the movement.
I asked another doctor who had been involved in the popular health movement,
Dr. Othman, to tell me about its beginnings. He told me that most of the doctors
involved in the movement had just finished medical school in the Eastern bloc and
had been impressed by certain local public health programs in regions of the Soviet
Union. Upon their return to the occupied territories, Dr. Othman explained, the
ideology of the emergent popular health movement was still malleable and had not
yet crystallized. The leading ideas that held the group together were very popular
and not very original. They shared ‘‘a national objective and a belief in justice.’’
‘‘We had energy,’’ he said. ‘‘We wanted to do something for our country. We had all
studied in the USSR or in other socialist countries during that period, and seen that
health care was free of charge, whereas back home, people had to pay unaffordable
prices for it. This was unjust. So justice was our goal.’’ His story about the popular
health movement’s beginnings emphasized its spontaneity, popularity and grass-
roots base and distanced the emergence of the group from the work of a political
party. At the same time, Dr. Othman’s account of the rapid and spontaneous
mobilization of people around health also described popular health as mapping itself
onto an existing social movement in the Occupied Territories. Their ‘‘entry points to
the communities’’ in the rural areas were the activists in the women’s movement,
which had existed since the beginning of the 20th century. By the 1970s, the
women’s movement had become very active in social services and community
organizing and ‘‘was more powerful than us [the health movement]. We had little
access to the communities we were targeting. They gave us the connections and the
communities began to work with us.’’ Dr. Othman thus inserts popular health into a
genealogy of mass-based social movements in the occupied territories. In his
narrative, the women’s organizations gave rise to and coexisted with popular health
27 For further discussion of the PA’s childbirth policy, see Giacaman et al. (2005).
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(as well as similar trends in education, agriculture and the very important youth
movement), which spurred the outbreak of the first intifada and its ‘‘neighborhood
committees,’’ which in turn solidified the second intifada when it erupted; all of
these movements and phases finally engendered the childbirth network.
It must be noted here that Dr. Othman’s reference to the origins of popular health
in the women’s movement shows an unusually humble reverence to a more senior
popular movement (especially one of women). In addition, at a time of
disenchantment with party politics, it also positions health within a genealogy of
popular, mass-based movements rather than ideologies of parties and governments.
The final point regarding this story is that Dr. Othman’s reference to ‘‘entry points
into the communities’’ reveals a consciousness of the class division separating the
doctors who then became leaders of the movement from the people they were trying
to mobilize through health care. ‘‘We believed in health, social justice and the
participation of people in health care. The idea was that comprehensive primary
health care pushes people to revolution. It would permit them to take power.’’
With time the vision became more specific to the context of Palestine. What
made the movement instantly popular, Dr. Othman said, was that people saw it as a
means of resistance to occupation. ‘‘Health was controlled by the Israeli authorities.
They decided whom to hire, whom not to hire, whom to treat, whom not to treat,
what to do, what not to do. So, developing health services without the permission of
the authorities was a challenge to occupation.’’ In Dr. Othman’s stories, the illegal
status of the popular health movement was essential to the creation of its popular
base. In their published chapter on the emergence of the popular health movement,
Mustafa Barghouti and Rita Giacaman (1990)—two of its leading figures—also talk
about the commitment to developing health services without getting legal
permission from the military authorities. What can already be derived from Dr.
Othman’s account becomes explicit in Barghouti and Giacaman’s analysis: the
illegality of the popular health movement stood in contrast to the politics of health
of the sumud-based charitable hospitals. They position the movement in stark and
proactive opposition to the Israeli politics of health in the occupied territories, but
also to the centralizing and legalistic politics of health of the PLO.
Dr. Othman went on to recount the bureaucratization of the movement about a
decade after its emergence and the role the political parties played in this process.
The movement, he noted, created an umbrella organization, called the Union of
Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, over which political parties sought control.
In the UPMRC, disagreements started to emerge. Members from Fatah28 and the
Popular Front29 seceded and created similar organizations, but close to their own
parties. UPMRC was left to the Communist Party.30 Dr. Othman thus inserted the
history of the political parties into a second phase of the history of the popular health
movement, a phase now dominated by institutional history. In his story, the first
28 Fatah is the hegemonic Palestinian nationalist party, headed by Yasser Arafat until his death in
November 2005, and then by Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), elected to succeed him as president of the
PA.
29 The PFLP is a Marxist, pan-Arab party considered more intransigent than Fatah.
30 The Palestinian Communist Party (now renamed Palestinian People’s Party), unlike Fatah and the
PFLP, had always favored a two-state solution for Palestine.
Cult Med Psychiatry (2008) 32:328–357 349
123
decade of the movement was exciting and popular, whereas the second phase was
tainted by the politics of bureaucracies, internal power struggles and political parties.
Dr. Siham, for her part, was clearly accustomed to being a spokesperson for the
childbirth network. She had long been a leading person in the popular health
movement and politically involved. Her interview had the aura of a political speech.
After leaving the UPMRC, she joined a practice in downtown Ramallah. But when
the closure started, she said, the childbirth network re-energized her. It brought back
the memories and passion she had found in her initial work with the UPMRC. Like
Dr. Siham, Dr. Othman was speaking from the perspective of someone who had
been very active in the former health movement but now worked in the post-Oslo
nongovernmental organization sector, which had become established and donor-
driven. They took pride in their past involvement in the health movement. Bringing
back the glorious past and seeing a network in the present reinstated some of their
lost status.
In addition to their importance from the point of view of the researcher seeking a
multidimensional perspective on capital historical processes, these two interviews
illustrate perfectly the existence of a second paradigmatic vision of the idea of the
nation, as exemplified by the dispersed clinics, the popular health movement and,
more recently, the so-called network. In this paradigm, the traditional monolithic
vision of the first image is broken down and replaced by a socially based model, in
which the nation emerges out of a web of social relations dedicated to national but
also social struggle, and seeking agency for the subaltern. The health system is a
microcosm of this socially based vision. The administration of health should be
decentralized. The primacy of the ministry of health should be questioned. The
village health worker, introduced by the UPMRC in the late 1980s, has become a
significant figure. The system is looser, broader and, in theory, less subject to
vertical control. It should be noted that this vision too is contested, on the one hand,
by those who refuse the notion of a health network and, on the other hand, by those
who contest its authenticity in this particular context.
Physicians: Glorification and Vilification
Doctors as Statesmen
This article has a number of doctor-as-strategist stories. The successful strategist is a
politician and, potentially, a statesperson. The lines between doctor and statesman
are blurred in the occupied territories because of the considerable number of doctors
in key positions within Palestinian political parties. To speak only of top leadership,
Dr. Fathi Arafat, brother of Yasser Arafat, was head of the Palestinian Red Crescent
Society until his death. The founder and historic leader of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), George Habash, was a physician. In the internal
leadership,31 Dr. Haidar Abd-al-Shafi, now deceased, was close to the Communist
31 From inside the occupied territories, as opposed to the external leadership, which until the 1990s was
headquartered in Amman, Beirut and, finally, Tunis.
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Party and the former head of the Red Crescent Society in Gaza. Dr. Mustafa
Barghouti heads an opposition movement, the Palestinian National Initiative (al-
mubadara al-wataniyya al-filistiniyya). Finally, two of the founders and leaders of
Hamas, Drs. Mahmud Zahhar and Abd-el-Aziz Rantisi, were physicians. The near-
hegemony of engineers among the founding members of Fatah in the 1950s has
been discussed by historians as the result of these young men becoming politically
active even as they worked in the oil economies of the Gulf. The presence of
numerous doctors in the leadership, especially in the internal leadership has,
however, not yet been explained. In contrast to the Indian movement for
independence, with its many lawyers, in Palestine doctors are associated with
leadership. The medical profession is heavily represented in the protostate, whether
in power or in opposition. The presence of doctors in the leadership makes for a
scenario where what is at stake is not simply laws and organization, but the
preservation of collective life itself, in the deepest biopolitical sense intended by
Foucault (2003). As a result of doctors’ association with power, social but also
political, doctors are sometimes the target of vilification and rumor, as the following
stories show.
The Birth Mother: A Protesting Citizen
Maha had arranged to give birth at the Red Crescent hospital in Ramallah. In early
April 2002, however, the severe curfew made it highly unlikely that she could make
it there and back. She wondered, ‘‘If I got to the hospital, how long would it take me
before I could come back? What about my husband and children alone at home? I
was afraid the soldiers might come to arrest my husband…. So, I was afraid the kids
might be alone. I thought about it a hundred times.’’ Maha had heard from a
neighbor that a doctor who lived in her neighborhood was assisting births in her
home. Eventually, she decided to give birth with this doctor.
At 6:30 PM, on the 14th of April, I went to [the doctor’s] house with my
neighbor. My cervix was dilated 3.5 cm. The doctor said, ‘‘In about two hours
you will give birth.’’ So she did things to facilitate my birth. At 9:30, I gave
birth to my daughter. Quickly, she cleaned me up. I had a tear, but she did not
stitch me up…. She made me understand that we were bothering her. She
kicked us out!
Maha and her neighbor consequently picked up the newborn and walked home.
On the way, they heard a tank approaching, so they knocked at the door of a house
to ask for cover.
The people did not just open the door for us. They had us sit down and made
us some tea, and we started talking. ‘‘How did the doctor let you leave when
you had barely given birth?’’ Even though I had a tear. See how lowly of the
doctor! The doctor has no principles…. Then our hosts telephoned the houses
along the main road. Young men were placed on the lookout from their roofs.
If a tank came, they would whistle. This way we got home.
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One element of Maha’s story was part of a collective narrative about life under
curfew. She, her neighbor and her newborn baby dodged tanks in the middle of the
night. She hid in the house of someone she did not even know. This family was
extremely hospitable. And the young men in the neighborhood worked out a system
of watching and whistling for them to run safely to their home. It is the story of
neighborhood cooperation, one reminiscent of popular movement stories from the
first intifada. The perspective is that of the villagers, dealing at once with the
overweening occupation and the unfeeling, authoritarian doctor.
In her story, the doctor (whom, incidentally, Dr. Siham would probably consider
as belonging to the childbirth network) was not part of the popular movement.
Maha’s tone was one of anger. She kept on repeating that the doctor was greedy,
inhospitable and, in the end, did not have the morals a doctor should have and the
politics someone under curfew should have. She had paid for the service, and
expected assistance during and for a few hours after birth in return. Doctors, she
commented, should have humanistic values and political principles. Within the
narration of a communal story of her giving birth under curfew, Maha integrated a
staunch critique of the medical care she received, and contributed to a potentially
systematic critique of the doctor as mandarin.
I first heard of Maha’s birth story as a rumor, through the friend of one of her
neighbors. The story in the rumor was similar in structure (although told with much
less detail): she broke the curfew during the night, and was helped by the
neighborhood to get back and forth from the doctor’s house, but the doctor was
inhumane and did not tend to Maha’s tear. The rumors and our interview became, in
the eyes of those who participated in recounting them, instruments for the
propagation of a critique of doctors.
Clearly, some stories from women who had given birth at home during the
curfew did not contain such a harsh critique of the medical assistance they received.
However, those that did were interesting because of the demand for a different type
of care within the context of limited options. There were in fact many instances of
critiques of doctors and sometimes of midwives (some of whom, people claimed,
pretended to be doctors). In one village, closed off from its neighboring city, a
doctor had transformed the vaccination clinic into a space for birthing. She was a
gynecologist and had not assisted births in years. All of a sudden, during the month
of April, the doctor assisted about 40 births.
During one of these births, assisted by the doctor at the vaccination clinic-turned-
birthing clinic, a villager’s newborn died. ‘‘The whole village is talking about a
problem we had,’’ the director of the clinic told me. ‘‘But what could we do? We
were ill-equipped and unprepared to assist births in our clinic.’’ According to the
director and to some people in the village, the villagers blamed the doctor for the
newborn’s death. Eventually, they told me, the doctor had to leave the village.
Tamara, one of the women who gave birth to a healthy baby in the village during
this period of closure, voiced further criticism of this doctor. She had given birth in
her home, unexpectedly early. Her husband called the doctor right away and ‘‘it took
a whole hour for the doctor to come and cut the umbilical cord. And she lives close
by,’’ Tamara told me with a tone of reproach. She was bitter about the childbirth
assistance her village was offered, and blamed the doctor personally.
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My recounting of Tamara’s and Maha’s stories is by no means intended to
discredit the childbirth network. The health providers worked under difficult
conditions. Birth assistants were under pressure from the community and, on the
basis of their own political engagement, assisted births during curfews. They had
very little equipment and it was highly probable that they would not be able to
manage transport to the hospital in cases of emergency. Thus, as a listener to
Tamara’s and Maha’s stories, I shared their feelings of anger at a system of closures
as well as a system of medicine that allowed, and perhaps even systematically
produced, poor care during their births. However, in the end, I cannot blame the
doctors individually for this system of childbirth assistance. The demands made of
these health professionals, the pressures to which they were subjected, the
conditions under which they had to work, all combined to erase the individual blame
a story such as Maha’s carried.
During times of conflict, there is no legal system through which to deal with
malpractice in the occupied territories. Under the PA’s regulations regarding
childbirth, only dayat are permitted to assist home births on a regular basis.
However, by the time of the events narrated by these women, the legal and
executive system of the PA had crumbled. There was no question of prosecuting
these health professionals for assisting home births during the curfew. The birth
attendants’ accountability was primarily to the community. Maha’s and Tamara’s
stories were interesting for the very reason that they laid bare this popular rather
than formal system of accountability and uncovered a means of action for women
that would affect birth assistance in the future.
The vilification of doctors likewise points to the identification of doctors with
political leadership in Palestine. They are asked to be accountable and just in their
practice. They are sometimes portrayed as dishonest, money grubbing and self-
promoting. Such stories arise in a context where there is widespread dissatisfaction
with a Palestinian leadership under fire for its mismanagement of the intifada and of
public funds. Individual stories present in rumors and interviews about the
mismanagement of birth by a doctor echoed bigger stories in the public arena about
malgovernance. In her book, Adriana Petryna (2002) traces narratives of Chernobyl
‘‘sufferers’’ and presents life stories critical of the state and medicine. She shows
how the biology of citizens is both a medium of government and part of a political
process where it has become the grounds for staking citizenship claims. In my
research, similar processes are found to be at work, at a time when the strategists of
the state-in-the-making have made health an essential component of nation-
building. Quite logically, they are opening the door to being criticized by citizens
according to health-related criteria.
This brief overview of the politicized image of physicians—in the first instance,
as leaders and, in the second, as villains—demonstrates the extent to which both
images of the nation unveiled by discourses around medical care are contested on
the ground, by future and present mothers, and by others in the profession. The first,
sumud-rooted, unitary image is heavily questioned by a public (and by subaltern
birth professionals, notably midwives) that lived through two intifadas and the Oslo
interlude, dominated by a bungling Authority. But we have seen how the second,
socially based image of the Palestinian nation is likewise doubted. It is contested by
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the proponents of the first image, who continue to preach and practice the health
policies of centralized ‘‘expertise,’’ but also from within, most notably by a whole
series of subaltern women who interacted with and were subjected to its
practitioners. These critics are making a plea for the democratization of the entire
system. They want some control over their lives and therefore medical system, and
thus over affairs of state. Furthermore, the medical profession and the political
system are so deeply interconnected that, at the same time that there is a need for
doctors and their political involvement, they become the targets of rumor,
accusation and vilification. In many ways, they have come to stand in for the
failed promise of Palestinian statehood—symbolized not only by the occupation,
with its checkpoints and curfews, but by Palestine’s own political leaders.
Conclusion
One can only agree with Kathleen Stewart (1996) when she notes that her book, A
Space on the Side of the Road, is ‘‘a story in which there is always something more
to be said,’’ something that she hopes to help others ‘‘begin to imagine.’’ The key
relevance to our project lies here in the notion of beginning, because, temporally,
birth stories in Palestine, although they purport to narrate recent past events, are
resolutely oriented toward the future. The models of birth elaborated, as well as the
varieties of critiques expressed, concern the way in which future births can benefit
from the experiences of past ones.
It has been seen how Palestinians, through their interpretations of the
infrastructure of health and the experience of birth, project their disparate views
of the nation (and thus of the state) they are struggling to construct, with a
polarization between the Jacobin and the social model. In the former, derived from
the history and functioning of Makassed Hospital in Jerusalem, Dr. Rami’s
discourse was first dominated by the issue of funding and how it is invariably
forthcoming. The enemy remains the outside, colonialist force, and the contempo-
rary closure is a challenge triggering behavior analogous to the past instances of
sumud. The vision is somewhat modified by the accounts of midwives, who place
the emphasis on labor at the expense of what one might call the doctor’s ‘‘capital.’’
For them, work (assisting birth mothers) is the fundamental ethical value and thus
the source of economic and social value. Nonetheless, the perspective remains a
vertical one, structured around the hospital hierarchy. In the social model, the
institutional centralization present in the first model is contested, in the name of
interactions among professionals and mothers. The alternative hierarchy proposed
is: first, community; second, technology; and, finally, planning (and no longer
finances, labor and centralization). The perspective is here horizontal.
The two visions share in their insistence on the unity of the land, most notably
through the refusal to accept the exclusion of Jerusalem, and on the vital link
between the birth process, the medical infrastructure and the ongoing resistance to
occupation.
As the stories and the histories of Makassed Hospital and the UPMRC show, both
the sumud-based, unitary vision and the one grounded in a social project engendered
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dissident voices from within. The critique may come from disaffected former leaders,
and even more, from the marginalized, subaltern elements within each ideational
system: midwives, birth mothers, alienated doctors, nurses. The systems, despite their
differences, have commonalities. They became elitist, bureaucratic, top-down, center-
periphery in their operation. And implicitly the stories call for continuous thinking
about and restructuring of the two visions before they can be taken as viable
alternatives or microcosmic medical models of the nation. As always and everywhere,
the national project is constantly being reconfigured, reprojected, perhaps reinvented
as a function of the rise and fall of paradigms and the ultimate test of reality.
What this article also shows is that medicine became a site of political conflict on
multiple levels, the national level in fighting the occupation, the institutional level,
the professional level, the ideological level and among political leaders. What my
research also shows in the Palestinian case is the rise of the medical profession to
political prominence during the period of occupation. Within these medical/national
projects, the doctor acquires political stature, power and sovereign authority.
Writing the story of medicine and governance through the analysis of doctors,
movements and political leadership presents a counterpoint to the warnings of
humanitarian aid discourse and media about social disintegration, while allowing
for the existence of suffering by many different subjects in Palestinian society.
Furthermore, at a time when there is little consolation to be drawn from political and
economic prospects, a rethinking of existing paradigms regarding medical practice
(and malpractice), based on existing conditions in Palestine, is surely in order and in
the interests of a people that have decided to be, in particular as regards the
disposition of their bodies in the context of birth under occupation, the subject, and
not simply the object, of their own history.
Acknowledgments I thank the interviewees for taking the time to speak with me and making this work
possible. I am grateful to Michael Fischer, Harriet Ritvo and Joseph Dumit for their ongoing advice and
support. I am thankful to my former colleagues at MIT and Birzeit University and my present ones at the
American University of Beirut for providing me with academic support. I am indebted to friends,
colleagues and teachers for engaging with this work at different times during the process of researching
and writing it: Diana Allan, Omar Al-Dewachi, Sosi Andesian, Deema Arafah, Farha Ghannam, Rita
Giacaman, Byron Good, Evelynn Hammonds, Yamila Hussein, Erica James, Afamia Kaddour, Natasha
Khalidi, Cynthia Mynnti, Esra Ozkan, Sarah Pinto, Anne Pollock, Aslihan Sanal, Hania Sholkami,
Kaushik Sunder-Rajan, my sister-in-law and brother, Dahlia Gubara and Ali Wick, and my parents, Roger
Heacock and Laura Wick, as well as the reviewers and editors of CMP. The research on which this article
is based was partially funded by a grant from the MEAwards Program in Population and Social Sciences,
the Population Council, and the WANA regional office in Cairo.
References
Adams, Vincanne
1998 Doctors for Democracy: Health Professionals in the Nepal Revolution. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Agamben, Giorgio
1998 Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Anderson, Benedict
1991 Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised Edition.
London: Verso.
Cult Med Psychiatry (2008) 32:328–357 355
123
Arnold, David
1993 Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Barghouti, Mustafa
2005 Palestinian Defiance. Interview by Eric Hazan. New Left Review 32(March–April): 117–131.
Barghouti, Mustafa, and Rita Giacaman
1990 The Emergence of an Infrastructure of Resistance: The Case of Health. In Intifada: Palestine at
the Crossroads. Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., pp. 73–90. New York: Praeger.
Blecher, Robert
2002 The Medicalization of Sovereignty: Medicine, Public Health, and Political Authority in Syria,
1861–1936. Ph.D. dissertation. Stanford University.
Choices and Challenges for Changing Childbirth Research Network
2005 Routines in Facility-Based Maternity Care: Evidence from the Arab World. British Journal of
Obstetrics and Gynecology 112(September): 1270–1276.
Cousin, Andrew
2000 Ideology and Biomedicine on the Palestinian West Bank. Ph.D. dissertation. Emory University.
Farsoun, Samih, and Jean Landis
1990 The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the Intifada. In Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads.
Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., pp. 15–36. New York: Praeger.
Foucault, Michel
2004 Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Colle`ge de France (1978–1979). Paris: Gallimard.
2003 Society Must Be Defended. David Macey, trans. London: Penguin.
Giacaman, Rita, Laura Wick, Hanan Abdul-Rahim, and Livia Wick
2005 The Politics of Childbirth in the Context of Conflict: Policies or De Facto Practices? Health
Policy 72: 129–139.
Ginsburg, Fay, and Rayna Rapp
1995 Conceiving the New World Order: The Global Politics of Reproduction. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Guha, Ranajit
1988 The Prose of Counter-Insurgency. In Selected Subaltern Studies. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak, eds., pp. 45–88. New York: Oxford University Press.
Harlow, Barbara
1996 After Lives: Legacies of Revolutionary Writing. New York: Verso.
Heacock, Roger
2008 Seizing the Initiative, Regaining a Voice: The Palestinian al-Aqsa Intifada as a Struggle of the
Marginalized. In Subalterns and Social Protest—History from Below in the Middle East and
North Africa. Stephanie Cronin, ed. London: Routledge.
Inhorn, Marcia
1996 Infertility and Patriarchy: The Cultural Politics of Gender and Family Life in Egypt.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Kahn, Susan
2000 Reproducing Jews: A Cultural Account of Assisted Reproduction in Israel. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press.
Kanaaneh, Rhoda
2002 Birthing the Nation. Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Kanafani, Ghassan
1969 Aid ila Haifa (Return to Haifa). In Al-Athar al-Kamila (Collected Works). Vol. 1. Beirut: Dar al-
Tali’a.
Peteet, Julie
1991 Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Petryna, Adriana
2002 Life Exposed: Biological Citizens After Chernobyl. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Renan, Ernest
[1882] 1998 Qu’est-ce qu’ une Nation? Paris: Editions Mille et une Nuits.
356 Cult Med Psychiatry (2008) 32:328–357
123
Sayigh, Yezid
1997 Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Shehadeh, Raja
1982 The Third Way. A Journal of Life in the West Bank. London: Quartet Books.
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty
1988 Deconstructing Historiography. In Selected Subaltern Studies. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak, eds., pp. 3–34. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stewart, Kathleen
1996 A Space on the Side of the Road: Cultural Poetics in an ‘‘Other’’ America. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Stoler, Ann Laura
2002 Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
1995 Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of
Things. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
World Bank
2003 Twenty-Seven Months—Intifada, Closures, and Palestinian Economic Crisis—An Assessment.
Jerusalem: The World Bank West Bank and Gaza Office. May.
Cult Med Psychiatry (2008) 32:328–357 357
123
